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THE EEC AND THE VREDELING PROPOSAL
For the past several years, the Vredeling Proposal has been one
of the most hotly debated topics in Western Europe. The Proposal
has been the focus of debate among politicians, business people,
union leaders and industrial relations experts. In its original form as
a draft directive of the European Economic Community, the Vredel-
ing Proposal would require multinational enterprises, including Eu-
ropean subsidiaries of American corporations doing business within
the Common Market, to consult with their employees'
representataives before adopting corporate policy which might affect
the livelihood or working conditions of the employees. In addition,
the directive would require multinational corporations to provide
their employees with information annually regarding not only the
corporation's structure and financial stability, but also its commercial
expectations, plans, and prospects for the future.
Although the amended proposal has had overwhelming support
from labor leaders, it has evoked explosive protest from both Euro-
pean and American business associations. Business officials in Eu-
rope and the United States have vehemently attacked the proposal by
arguing that the draft directive is not only too ideological, but imple-
menting the directive would serve to undermine the authority of
management of European subsidiaries.
This Article will analyze the development of the Vredeling Pro-
posal from its inception through its most recent revision. The Article
will examine many of the key provisions which have generated de-
bate and which ultimately led to the amended proposal. Finally, the
Article will analyze some of the possible difficulties which would be
encountered in implementing the current revision of the Vredeling
Proposal.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE VREDELING PROPOSAL
The implementation of the Marshall Plan in Western Europe
served to boost the weakened European economies of the post-war
years. In contrast to the economic growth and prosperity of the post-
war years, the 1970's and 1980's saw a decline in economic strength
throughout Western Europe.' Following the devaluation of the
United States dollar in 1971, and the oil crisis of 1973-1974, Western
Europe has been plagued by spiraling inflation and increased unem-
1. Carr & Kolkey, US. Perspective on the Vredeling Proposal and Other Proposals by the
EEC, 1984 INT'L. Bus. LAW. 57.
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ployment.2 The rate of unemployment throughout Western Europe
increased from approximately three percent in 1970 to eleven percent
in 1984.' Over the past decade, the number of jobs has increased by
only one-half percent in the ten-member European Economic Com-
munity.4 Furthermore, if the rate of unemployment continues to rise
while the European gross national product increases only slightly,
the European Community is certain to suffer the effects of an infla-
tionary economy.'
Given the weakened European economy as it has existed over
the past decade, it is not surprising that European Community offi-
cials have attempted to initiate various programs aimed at protecting
the rights of employees. For example, on October 9, 1972, the Euro-
pean Commission announced its Fifth Company Law Directive.
This directive, aimed at safeguarding employee participation in the
decisions of management, required that the employee representatives
be directly elected by the general workforce.6 In 1975, the Council of
Ministers adopted another directive which obligates employers to
comply with specific notification and consultation requirements when
a large number of employees are dismissed. This proposal focused on
the protection of employees in cases of collective redundancies.7 In
1977, the Council of Ministers adopted yet another directive which
gives employee representatives the right to receive notice and to par-
ticipate in consultations regarding corporate mergers and acquisi-
tions.' Like the previous directive, the purpose of the 1977 directive
was to safeguard the rights of employees.9
On October 24, 1980, the European Commission presented the
Vredeling Proposal to the Council of Ministers.'0 The adoption of
2. Although the 1973-74 oil crisis threatened the economies of developed countries
world-wide, the effects in Western Europe have continued for more than a decade. Id.
3. The New Economy, TIME, May 30, 1983, at 65.
4. Id.
5. See Carr & Kolkey, supra note 1, at 57.
6. 15 J.0. COMM. EUR. (No. C 131) 49 (1972).
7. Council Directive of 17 February 1975 on the Approximation of the Laws of Member
States Relating to Collective Redundancies, 18 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L. 48) 29 (1975).
8. Council Directive of 14 February 1977 on the Approximation of the Laws of the Mem-
ber States Relating to the Safeguarding of Employees'Rights in the Event of Transfers of Under-
takings, Businesses or Part of Business, 20 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 61) 26 (1977).
9. For a general discussion of the directives of 1975 and 1977, see Hepple, Community
Measures for the Protection of Workers Against Dismissals, 14 COMMON MARKET L. REV. 487
(1977).
10. Proposal for a Council Directive on Procedures for Informing and Consulting Employ-
ees of Undertakings with Complex Structures, in Particular Transnational Undertakings, 23 O.J.
EUR. COMM. (No. C 297) 3 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Vredeling Proposal].
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the proposal would obligate parent companies of a transnational en-
terprise to transmit specified types of information on a regular basis
to each of its subsidiaries in the European Economic Community."
In addition, the proposal would require that the management of these
subsidiaries consult with their employees' representatives on issues
relating to corporate business policies.12 The clash of interests be-
tween management and labor led to the adoption of an amended ver-
sion of the Vredeling Proposal on July 8, 1983.' 3 It is this proposal
that evoked extensive debate between management and union leaders
within the European Community.14
A. The Birth of the Vredeling Proposal
The Vredeling Proposal is the most significant European Com-
munity initiative which has been aimed at harmonizing corporate
policy with respect to the rights of employees.' 5 The presentation of
this particular proposal has caused the United States to become
acutely aware of the developments in European Economic Commu-
nity law. 1
6
The original proposal was named after its sponsor, Dutch So-
cialist Henk Vredeling. 7 Vredeling, a former Dutch defense minis-
ter, also served as the European Community's Commissioner for
11. For the specific provisions see id. at art. 3.
12. See id. at arts. 4-5 for the consultation requirements.
13. 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 217) 3 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Amended Vredeling
Proposal].
14. Since the presentation of the original Vredeling Proposal by the European Commis-
sion to the Council of Ministers in 1980, the Commission's most notable proposal has been a
draft of the Ninth Company Law Directive. The adoption of this draft directive would effec-
tively prevent a parent corporation from limiting its liability. See also Employee Information
and Consultation Procedures, BULL. OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (Supp. March 1980).
The draft of the Ninth Company Law Directive, as well as the Vredeling Proposal and the
proposed Fifth Company Law Directive have been sharply criticized because the proposals will
neither cushion the escalating effects of unemployment nor safeguard the rights of employees
within the European Economic Community. Arguably, the adoption of such proposals will
have a detrimental effect on employees by severely lessening the prospects of corporate invest-
ment in the European Economic Community. For this reason, the adoption of these proposals
may serve only to impede the creation of new jobs within the Community. See also Carr &
Kolkey, supra note 1, at 57.
15. Schneebaum, The Company Law Harmonization Program of the European Commu-
nity, 14 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 293, 321 (1982).
16. The potential issues raised by the information and consultation requirements include
effects on competition, stock prices, and the "insider trading" rules of the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission. Id. at 323.
17. Chadwin, Special Report: Vredeling-Europe Debates the Vredeling Concept, PERSON-
NEL ADMINISTRATOR, Sept. 1983, at 62.
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Employment and Social Affairs in 1980.18 Since the time of its origi-
nal draft, the Vredeling Proposal has been supported by the British
Laborite Ivor Richard, Vredeling's successor as Commissioner.' 9 In
addition, the Proposal has been widely supported by labor union rep-
resentatives of multinational enterprises.
The amended proposal for a Council Directive on the proce-
dures for informing and consulting employees was adopted formally
by the Commission on July 8, 1983.20 The amended proposal incor-
porates the opinions of both the European Parliament2' and the Eco-
nomic and Social Committee22 concerning the original Vredeling
Proposal. It is apparent from the opinions of the European Parlia-
ment and the Economic and Social Committee that both recognized
the need for a Community Directive for informing and consulting
employees. In September 1982, the European Parliament debated
the Commission's proposal on the basis of a report written by the
British Conservative Mr. Spencer as a representative of the Social
Affairs Committee.23
In December 1982, although, the European Parliament ap-
proved the proposal, it required that various amendments be drafted
in order to alleviate the anxieties felt by employers' organizations
with regard to maintaining the authority of local management
through employee representatives. Moreover, the European Parlia-
ment required amendments which would serve to strengthen the pro-
visions relating to the secrecy of corporate affairs.2 4
18. Id. Henk Vredeling's term as Commissioner for Employment and Social Affairs
ended on December 31, 1980. See Schneebaum, supra note 15, at 321.
19. Chadwin, supra note 17, at 62. Richard also served as the British Ambassador to the
U.N. from 1974 to 1979.
20. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
21. The views of the European Parliament are found in Council Directive on Procedures
for Informing and Consulting the Employees of Undertakings with Complex Structures, in Par-
ticular Transnational Undertakings, 25 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 292) 33 (1982); and Opinion
on the Proposal for a Directive on Procedures for Informing and Consulting the Employees of
Undertakings with Complex Structures, in Particular Transnational Undertakings, 26 O.J. EUR.
COMM. (No. C 13) 25 (1983).
22. For the Committee's views on the Proposal, see Opinion on the Proposalfor a Directive
on Procedures for Informing and Consulting the Employees of Undertakings with Complex
Structures, in Particular Transnational Undertakings, 25 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 77) 6
(1982).
23. The content of the proposal and the debate in the European Parliament and the Eco-
nomic and Social Committee is reported in BLANPAIN, BLANQUET, HERMAN, MOUTY &
VREDELING, Information and Consultation of Employees in Multinational Enterprises, BULL.
OF CoMP. LAB. REL. (1983).
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In January 1982, the Economic and Social Committee held a
debate on the Commission's proposal. During the debate, it ap-
peared that the only common ground between the Committee mem-
bers representing employees' interests and those representing
employers' interests was that both were cognizant of the fact that the
proposal could have a significant impact on labor relations. Both
groups sharply disagreed, however, on whether this would be detri-
mental for labor relations and the state of the economy in general.
Nonetheless, the Economic and Social Committee approved the pro-
posal contingent on the further simplification of the structure of the
draft Directive.25
Despite these views and the fact that the European Commission
had made it clear that it was ready to follow most of the amendments
to the original proposal, various industrial organizations argued that
there were neither practical nor legal grounds on which the Council
should go forward. These industrial organizations asserted that the
proposed directive would have an adverse effect on industry and
would retard the economic recovery of the European Community.26
Contrary to the opinions held by the industrial organizations, the
trade unions supported the view that such a directive was necessary.
They remained dissatisfied with the amended draft directive to the
extent that it served to compromise essential points regarding the ini-
tial Vredeling Proposal in a way which was not wholly beneficial to
employees.2"
B. The 1980 Draft Directive
Analyzing the most recent version of the Vredeling Proposal
presupposes a thorough understanding of the original draft directive.
For this reason, the following discussion will focus on the various
obligations imposed on multinational enterprises by the original draft
directive. The discussion will then analyze some of the most signifi-
cant changes in the Vredeling Proposal as amended on July 8, 1983.
Under the original draft, multinational corporations operating
within the European Economic Community would be required to
safeguard the rights of employees in three distinct ways. First, mul-
tinational enterprises would be required to provide employees' repre-
25. See 25 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 77) 6 (1982). The approval was by a vote of 79 in
favor, 61 opposed, with I I abstentions.
26. Chadwin, supra note 17, at 62.
27. Pipkom, The Draft Directive on Procedures for Informing and Consulting Employees,
20 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 727, 734 (1983).
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sentatives with "a clear picture of the activities of the dominant
undertaking and its subsidiaries taken as a whole," on a periodic ba-
sis.28 In defining what is "a clear picture of the activities," the Pro-
posal requires multinationals to furnish information relating to "the
economic and financial situation,... the employment situation and
probable trends .... manufacturing and working methods, [and] all
procedures and plans liable to have a substantial effect on employees'
interests."29
It is apparent from a cursory review of these provisions that the
language is vague and subject to a variety of interpretations. Irre-
spective of how difficult it might be to define these terms with any
degree of accuracy or certitude, what is required to be disclosed by
multinational enterprises under the Proposal is subject to negotia-
tion. Given this fact, corporate undertakings would be hard pressed
to argue that circulating an information sheet describing in general
terms the company's plans for the future to their employees is unduly
burdensome.
Second, the Vredeling Proposal makes the disclosure of informa-
tion to employees mandatory when "the management of a dominant
undertaking proposes to make a decision concerning the whole or a
major part of the dominant undertaking or of one of its subsidiaries
which is likely to have a substantial effect on the interests of its em-
ployees." 3 The parent company is required to disclose such infor-
mation to the management of its subsidiary not less than forty days
"before adopting the decision."31 During that time, the parent com-
pany must communicate such information "without delay" to em-
ployees' representatives whose opinion must then be sought within
thirty days.32 In addition, the disclosure must include "the grounds
for the proposed decision, its legal and social consequences for the
employees, and the measures planned in respect of these employ-
ees."33 Included among company decisions which trigger these obli-
gations are plant closings or transfers, "substantial modifications" to
a company's activities or to its organization, and the introduction or
28. Vredeling Proposal, supra note 10, at art. 5, para. 1. It should be noted that references
to the Proposal are to the published version of the European Commission.
29. Id. at art. 5, paras. 2(b), (d), (g), (h).
30. Id. at art. 6, para. I.
31. Id.
32. The Proposal states that, "The management of each subsidiary shall be required to
communicate this information without delay to its employees' representatives and to ask for
their opinion within a period of not less than 30 days." Id. at art. 6, para. 3.
33. Id. at art. 6, para. I.
Vol. 16
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termination of long-term cooperation with other enterprises.34
Problems may arise, however, when the parent corporation is
saddled with the obligation of disseminating information relating to a
corporate policy decision prior to the time that policy decision is for-
mally adopted. Initially, it is conceivable that the disclosure of such
information could adversely effect market competition within the Eu-
ropean Economic Community. Furthermore, with respect to United
States corporations holding subsidiaries in the Community, it is pos-
sible that the disclosure requirement would violate the "insider trad-
ing" rules of the United States Securities and Exchange
Commission.35
Third, the Vredeling Proposal would require that the consulta-
tions between management and employees' representatives be "with a
view to reaching agreement on the measures planned in respect of
them."' 36 In the event that the management of the subsidiary should
neglect to carry out such consultations, employees' representatives
would be permitted to consult with the management of the parent
undertaking.37 This would be true even though the parent undertak-
ing is located outside the European Community. Thus, it is possible
that employees' representatives would communicate with the man-
agement of a United States parent corporation in an effort to obtain
that information which should have been made available but for the
subsidiary's failure to act.
The draft directive would impose the three obligations discussed
above on multinational parent corporations irrespective of whether
34. The Proposal states that:
The decisions referred to in paragraph (1) shall be those relating to: (a) the
closure or transfer of an establishment or major parts thereof; (b) revisions, extensions
or substantial modifications to the activities of the undertaking; (c) major modifica-
tions with regard to organization; (d) the introduction of long-term cooperation with
other undertakings or the cessation of such cooperation.
Id. at art. 6, para. 2.
35. See Schneebaum, supra note 15, at 323 (citing 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1981)). It has
been argued that if management is required to disclose future plans to employees' representa-
tives within the European Community, this information could be publicly disseminated to
avoid purported insider trading. Id.
36. Vredeling Proposal, supra note 10, at art. 6, para. 4.
37. The Proposal states that:
Where the management of the subsidiaries does not communicate to the employ-
ees' representatives the information required under paragraph (3) or does not arrange
consultations as required under paragraph (4), such representatives shall be author-
ized to open consultations, through authorized delegates, with a view to obtaining
such information and, where appropriate, to reaching agreement on the measures
planned with regard to the employees concerned.
Id. at art. 6, para. 5.
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they are located within the European Community.38 Imposing these
requirements on parent corporations located outside the European
Community may lead to a serious problem of enforcement jurisdic-
tion. The jurisdiction of the courts of the European Community does
not extend beyond its borders. Although parent corporations outside
the European Community might voluntarily comply with the provi-
sions of the draft directive, provisions which allow sanctions against
corporations failing to comply might not be recognized by non-Euro-
pean authorities.39 If these authorities were unwilling to recognize
such provisions, it would be pointless to expect them to enforce these
same provisions.
Embodied within Article 8 of the Vredeling Proposal is the
Commission's attempt to solve the problem of enforcement jurisdic-
tion. That section provides:
Where the management of the dominant undertaking whose deci-
sion-making centre is located outside the Community and which
controls one or more subsidiaries in the Community does not en-
sure the presence within the Community of at least one person
able to fulfill the requirements as regards disclosure of information
and consultation laid down by this Directive, the management of
the subsidiary that employs the largest number of employees
within the Community shall be responsible for fulfilling the obliga-
tions imposed on the management of the dominant undertaking by
this Directive.4°
Thus, whenever employees' representatives seek information located
beyond the borders of the European Community, the Vredeling Pro-
posal would obligate those corporations located within the Commu-
nity to obtain the information and disclose it. With the adoption of
this provision, the European Community effectively avoids imposing
any obligations directly on foreign undertakings.
Under this provision, a foreign parent company would have two
alternatives prior to rendering any decision subject to the disclosure
38. Id. Because no distinction is drawn, multinational parent corporations would have to
comply in order to operate their subsidiaries within the European Economic Community.
39. The Vredeling Proposal provides that only "Member States shall provide for appropri-
ate penalties for failure to comply with the obligations ... [of the information disclosure re-
quirements]." Id. at art. 5, para. 5. The Proposal also provides that only "Member States shall
provide for appropriate penalties in case of failure to fulfill the obligations ... [of the consulta-
tion requirements]." Id. at art. 6, para. 6. Employees' representatives are entitled to an appeal
to a court "or other competent national authorities for measures to be taken to protect their
interests." Id. There is no enforcement provision which would include foreign or non-Euro-
pean Community parent undertakings.
40. Id. at art. 8.
Vol. 16
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and consultation requirements of the Proposal. First, the parent
company could appoint an agent or representative in Europe to con-
sult with the employees' representative. This presupposes, of course,
that the agent appointed by the parent has sufficient knowledge about
the company's decision. Second, the parent company could commu-
nicate its knowledge and information to its largest European subsidi-
ary.4 Thus, it is incumbent on the foreign parent corporation to
make the important decisions concerning the manner in which confi-
dential information will be distributed within the company's
infrastructure.
In most instances, the periodic disclosure requirements of the
Vredeling Proposal would not create problems of confidentiality. In
a number of cases, however, the dissemination of information relat-
ing to proposed corporate policies, before such policies are adopted
formally, may well undermine the interests of the corporation.42 The
security of complex commercial and financial dealings of the corpo-
ration could be jeopardized at the expense of the Vredeling Propo-
sal's disclosure and consultation requirements. Employees'
representatives who will have access to confidential corporate infor-
mation are merely directed to exercise "discretion."43 Although
member States are empowered to "impose appropriate penalties in
cases of infringement of the secrecy requirement,"' there is no sanc-
tion that could adequately restore the company to the competitive
position it would have lost.45
Despite the criticism of the Vredeling Proposal by business orga-
nizations, the Proposal was sent to the European Parliament and the
Economic and Social Committee in 1981 and was then reviewed by
three parliamentary committees.46 In September, 1982, the proposed
41. The Proposal imposes the duty on the largest subsidiary to consult with employees'
representatives and provide the necessary information even though the subsidiary may in no
way be affected by the decision of the parent undertaking. Id.
42. See, e.g., Continental Oil Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 519 F.2d 31, 35 (5th Cir.
1975) (harm to competitive position); Chrysler Corp. v. Schlesinger, 412 F. Supp. 171, 176 (D.
Del. 1976) (disclosure of trade secret and commercial or financial information causing competi-
tive harm).
43. Vredeling Proposal, supra note 10, at art. 15, paras. 1-3.
44. Id.
45. See NATIONAL FOREIGN TRADE COUNCIL, MEMORANDUM CONCERNING PROPOSED
EC DIRECTIVE ON CONSULTATIONS WITH EMPLOYEES 7 (Feb. 19, 1981). According to the
National Foreign Trade Council, "the directive would deter corporate management from inno-
vative competitiveness of European Community enterprises in comparison with companies in
other parts of the world." Id. at 5.
46. Report on the Vredeling Proposal, EUR. PARL. DoC. (No. 1-324) (1982). The three
parliamentary committees which reviewed the Vredeling Proposal and prepared reports were
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revisions of both the European Commission and the Economic and
Social Committee were sent before the planning session of Parlia-
ment. After much debate, Parliament voted to defer further review
of the Proposal until the October session. In October, 1982, Parlia-
ment approved a text containing some significant alterations to the
original draft directive.47 The most significant changes included the
following:
1) The minumum size of an enterprise to "trigger" obligations
under the Proposal would be 100 employees in any European
Community enterprise and 1,000 employees in the entire group;
2) employees' representatives would be freely elected by the
workforce at large;
3) instead of holding the largest European Community subsidi-
ary of a foreign parent undertaking responsible for meeting the
disclosure and consultation requirements, the same requirements
would be imposed on management of the local subsidiary affected
by the decisions;
4) the scope of consultation obligations would be clarified;
5) consultations would be limited to the effects of a proposed de-
cision on the workforce without considering the decision itself;
6) there would be limitations on "by-pass" provisions that give
European Community employees' representatives access to the
parent company's management by granting the right to make a
written demand for information only when the subsidiary refuses
to supply it; and
7) business and trade secrets, including information that could
impact on market share prices, would be exempt from mandatory
disclosure.48
The approval of such a text by Parliament was not, however,
determinative of the Proposal's final adoption through the legislative
process. In October 1982 Parliament elected not to follow the usual
E.E.C. procedures which would have completed the legislative pro-
cess for a proposed directive as required under the Treaty of Rome.49
Instead of formally adopting the text and sending it on to the Euro-
pean Council, Parliament elected to ask Commissioner Richard to
state his opinion on the various amendments to the proposed direc-
the Committee on Social Affairs and Employment, the Committee on Economic and Monetary
Affairs, and the Committee on Legal Affairs. See id.
47. See id.
48. See generally 25 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. C 292) 33 (1982) for Parliament's changes to
the Vredeling Proposal.
49. See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, art.
54(2), 298 U.N.T.S. 3.
Vol. 16
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tive. Since the Commissioner is empowered to propose his own mod-
ifications, 0 he undertook the responsibility of consulting labor and
industrial groups and reported back to Parliament during the No-
vember 1982 session. Since Parliament's actions in this area are
strictly advisory, the Commissioner is not under any obligation to
follow the decision of the European Parliament. In fact, substantial
portions of the watered-down draft finally adopted by the European
Parliament in the fall of 1982 were rejected by Commissioner
Richard."
During the early months of 1983, the most controversial
passages of the proposed directive were reviewed by Commissioner
Richard and his staff. In addition, the Commissioner met with Euro-
pean and American business leaders.52  After nearly three years of
debate and negotiation, the amended proposal for a Council Direc-
tive on procedures for informing and consulting employees was fi-
nally adopted by the European Commission on July 8, 1983. 53
II. THE AMENDED VREDELING PROPOSAL
A. Scope of the Draft Directive
According to the amended proposal adopted by the Commis-
sion, the directive is applicable to groups of undertakings which em-
ploy, in their entirety, at least 1,000 employees within the European
Community,54 and to single undertakings operating through distinct
plants or "establishments" and employing the same number of em-
ployees in the Community. 5 Under Article 4 of the original propo-
50. Id. at art. 149. Parliament appears to have wanted assurances that the Commis-
sioner's modifications would not differ substantially from those it had already approved.
51. Under European Community procedures, it is the Commission's duty to make recom-
mendations to the Council. Only the Council, which is composed of cabinet ministers from
each member country, has the power to enact a binding, Community-wide directive. Even
then, each directive must be written into enabling legislation within each country in the
Community.
52. The Commissioner's efforts were aimed at satisfying the needs of both corporate man-
agement and employees' representatives. Commissioner Richard attended a variety of meet-
ings held in the United States with the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the U.S. Council for
International Business, and the American Bar Association. Chadwin, supra note 17, at 63.
53. The amended proposal was submitted to the European Council on July 17, 1983. See
Amended Vredeling Proposal, supra note 13.
54. The term "undertakings" includes both the parent undertaking and its subsidiaries.
See Amended Vredeling Proposal, supra note 13, at art. l(a).
55. The Amended Proposal provides that:
I. This Directive relates to procedures for informing and consulting the employees
-of a subsidiary in the Community when a total of at least 1,000 workers is
employed in the Community by the parent undertaking and its subsidiaries taken
as a whole
12
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sal, the draft directive would have applied to dominant undertakings
employing in their entirety at least 100 workers in the Community.
56
The minimum of 1,000 employees was introduced at the request of
the European Parliament in an effort to exempt smaller enterprises
from the procedures listed in the directive.
The draft directive does not concern itself with the information
and consultation of employees of a parent corporation unless they are
employed in a plant distinct from the parent's main office.5 7 The
Commission apparently believed such provisions were unnecessary
because national laws have already been promulgated to safeguard
the interests of these employees. Under Section 2 of the original pro-
posal, the directive would have applied the information and consulta-
tion procedures to groups of undertakings and transnational
multiplant undertakings." In Section 3, however, basically identical
provisions were to be applied to groups of undertakings and mul-
tiplant undertakings all of which are located within the same member
State.59 This distinction is attributable to the fact that the original
draft proposal was targeted only at transnational undertakings and
groups of undertakings. It became apparent to the drafters of the
amended proposal that it was also necessary to include those under-
-of an undertaking having in the Community one or more establishments when
a total of at least 1,000 workers is employed in the Community by the undertak-
ing as a whole.
2. When the decision-making centre of an undertaking is located in a non-member
country its management may be represented in the Community by an agent au-
thorized to fulfill the requirements regarding information and consultation laid
down by this Directive. In the absence of such an agent the management of each
subsidiary concerned in the Community shall be held responsible for the obliga-
tions arising from Articles 3 and 4.
Id. at art. 2.
56. The Proposal originally proved that:
The management of a dominant undertaking whose decision-making centre is located
in a Member State of the Community and which has one or more subsidiaries in at
least one other Member State shall be required to disclose, via the management of
those subsidiaries, information to employees' representatives in all subsidiaries em-
ploying at least 100 employees in the Community in accordance with Article 5 and to
consult them in accordance with Article 6.
Vredeling Proposal, supra note 10, at art. 4
57. Amended Vredeling Proposal, supra note 13, at art. 2. For text see supra note 55.
58. Vredeling Proposal, supra note 10, at art. 4. For text see supra note 56.
59. The Proposal originally provided that:
The management of a dominant undertaking whose decision-making centre is
located in a Member State of the Community and which has one or more subsidiaries
in the same Member State shall be required, via the management of its subsidiaries, to
disclose information to employees' representatives in all subsidiaries employing at
least 100 employees in that State in accordance with Article II and to consult them in
accordance with Article 12.
Id. at art. 10.
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takings that confine their operations to a single Member State. For
this reason, the Commission merged Sections 2 and 3.
In the situation where a parent corporation has its decision-
making center located outside Europe, it was necessary to include a
separate provision in the amended proposal governing the informa-
tion and consultation procedures.6 ° In such a case, the procedures
may be satisfied in one of two ways. First, the management of the
parent corporation can appoint an authorized agent in the Commu-
nity responsible for carrying out the procedures on behalf of that cor-
poration. Second, if an agent is unavailable, the management of each
subsidiary will be held liable for complying with the information and
consultation procedures as required by the draft directive.6 Under
the initial draft, the management of the subsidiary employing the
largest number of employees within the Community was to be held
responsible for satisfying the requirements of the consultation and
information procedures imposed on the management of the parent
corporation.62 This provision was modified at the request of Parlia-
ment because it seemed unduly burdensome to saddle the subsidiary
having the greatest workforce with the parent undertaking's
obligation.63
The element which triggers the application of the information
and consultation requirements for multiplant undertakings is the
existence of entities which are geographically distinct parts of the un-
dertaking. 6 Under Article 6 of the amended draft which deals with
those undertakings, the provisions for parent corporations and sub-
sidiaries shall apply mutatis mutandis.65 Under the original draft di-
rective, the information and consultation requirements applied only
to those subsidiaries and establishments employing at least 100 work-
ers in the Community.66 This minimum has been deleted in the
amended draft. Member States have the option of limiting the infor-
mation and consultation procedures provided for in the draft direc-
tive to subsidiaries and establishments which satisfy the requirements
60. Amended Vredeling Proposal, supra note 13, at art. 2(2). For text see supra note 55.
61. Id.
62. Vredeling Proposal, supra note 10, at art. 8.
63. See Amended Vredeling Proposal, supra note 13, at art. 2(2). For text see supra note
55.
64. Id. at art. 1, para. b. The entities are termed -establishments." Id.
65. Id. at art. 6. Mutatis mutandis is defined as: "With the necessary changes in points of
detail, meaning that matters or things are generally the same, but to be altered when necessary,
as to names, offices, and the like." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 919 (5th ed. 1979).
66. Vredeling Proposal, supra note 10, at art. 4. For text see supra note 56.
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for electing or designating a body to represent the employees. 67 This
facilitates the implementation of the obligations provided for in the
draft directive within the context of employee organizations.
Under Article 8 of the amended draft, member States are free to
promulgate laws which are more favorable to the employees than
those laid down in the draft directive.68 In addition, Article 8 allows
member States to enact special provisions for undertakings of a polit-
ical, religious, scientific, or other non-economic character. This pro-
vision was requested by the European Parliament in order to take
account of the fact that in the Federal Republic of Germany such
undertakings are largely exempted from the application of the provi-
sions of the Works Council Act of 1972 on information and consulta-
tion. 69  These exemptions help ensure the freedom to which the
undertaking is entitled under national law from interference by em-
ployees' representatives.70
B. Disclosure of Information
Article 3 of the amended proposal mandates that management
of a parent undertaking forward general information which gives a
clear picture of its activities and those of its subsidiaries to the man-
agement of the subsidiaries located within the European Commu-
nity. 7t The management of each subsidiary shall then disclose this
67. Amended Vredeling Proposal, supra note 13, at art. 5, para. 4. "Member States may
limit the obligations laid down in Articles 3 and 4 to the subsidiaries which, in respect of the
number of employees, fulfill the conditions for the election or designation of a collegiate body
representing the employees existing under national law of practices." Id.
68. The Amended Proposal states:
1. This Directive shall be without prejudice to measures taken pursuant to Council
Directive 75/129/EEC of 17.02.1975 on the approximation of the laws of the
Member States relating to collective redundancies (1) and Directive 77/187/EEC
of 14.02.1977 on the safeguarding of employees' rights in the event of transfers
(2) or introduce laws, regulations or administrative provisions which are more
favourable to employees.
2. In implementing this Directive, Member States may lay down special provisions
for undertakings and establishments whose direct and main objectives are:
(a) political, religious humanitarian, charitable, educational, scientific or artis-
tic, or
(b) related to public information or expression of opinion. The special provi-
sions may only be such as are necessary to ensure that such undertakings
enjoy the freedom to which they are entitled under the laws of the Member
States to which they are subject.
3. This Directive shall be without prejudice to the application of national laws con-
cerning bankruptcy, winding up proceeding arrangements, compositions or other
similar proceeding insofar as these proceedings result from judicial decisions.
Id. at art. 8.
69. The German Works Council Act of 1972, at art. 118.
70. Id.
71. The Amended Proposal provides that:
Vol. 16
15
Fera: The European Economic Community and the Vredeling Proposal: The D
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1986
THE EEC AND THE VREDELING PROPOSAL
information to the employees' representatives within the subsidiary.
According to the amended draft directive, such disclosure must take
place annually, while the initial draft required disclosure every six
months. Similarly, the draft directive requires that specific informa-
tion be disclosed to the employees' representatives.72 Although it is
uncertain whether the specific information required can be utilized
effectively by employees' representatives, it is arguable that even an
annual disclosure can be a burden on management. Furthermore,
disclosing specific information on issues such as plant closures may
have an adverse impact on the level of productivity and morale
among employees.
Whenever the management fails to fulfill its disclosure obliga-
tions, the representatives of the employees may approach the man-
agement of the parent company and demand in writing that the
relevant information be communicated without delay. The informa-
tion is then to be given to the management of the subsidiary and
submitted to the employees.73
The initial proposal obligated the management of the parent
company to supply information which had not been properly dis-
closed directly to the employees' representatives who requested it.
74
This so-called "by-pass" procedure was greeted with disapproval by
the European Parliament because the procedure might undermine
the authority of local management. Moreover, the draft directive ob-
ligates member States to provide for "appropriate penalties for failure
to comply with the information requirements.
'75
At least once a year, at a fixed date, the management of a parent undertaking
shall forward in an intelligible form general information giving a clear picture of the
activities of the parent undertaking and its subsidiaries as a whole to the management
of each of its subsidiaries in the Community, with a view to the communication of its
information to the employees' representatives as provided in paragraph 4 below. For
the same purpose, the management of the parent undertaking shall forward to the
management of each subsidiary concerned specific information on a particular sector
of production area in which the subsidiary is active.
Amended Vredeling Proposal, supra note 13, at art. 3, para. 1.
72. The draft directive specifies that the details of the economic and financial conditions,
the employment situation, and possible trends should be included. Id. at art. 3, paras. 2-3.
73. The Amended Proposal provides that:
If the management of the subsidiary fails to fulfill its obligation to communicate
information required to its employees' representatives within 30 days of the date
fixed, referred to in paragraph 1, or of the date of communication in the case of the
up-dated information referred to in paragraph 3, the employees' representatives of the
subsidiary may approach in writing the management of the parent undertaking. That
undertaking shall be obligated to communicate the relevant information without de-
lay to the management of the subsidiary.
Id. at art. 3, para. 5.
74. Vredeling Proposal, supra note 10, at art. 5, para. 4. For text see supra note 67.
75. Amended Vredeling Proposal, supra note 13, at art. 3, para. 7.
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In the situation where a parent company is also a subsidiary of
some other corporation, the company is theoretically obliged to pro-
vide the information required by the directive with respect to its own
activities and those of its subsidiaries. This responsibility terminates,
however, when the other parent corporation itself fulfills the direc-
tive's requirement by providing information on its activities and all
its subsidiaries. The provision ensures, inter alia, that such sub-
groups are within the purview of the information procedures of the
directive.7 6
C. The Duty to Consult
Consultation procedures provided for in the draft directive are
triggered each time the management of the parent undertaking pro-
poses to make a decision "concerning the whole or a major part of
the parent undertaking or of a subsidiary in the Community, which is
liable to have serious consequences for the interests of the employees
of its subsidiaries in the Community . . . ."" In this situation, the
management of the parent company must forward "precise informa-
tion" to the management of each subsidiary involved in "good time"
before a final decision is made. This is necessary so that the informa-
tion can be passed on to employees' representatives and thereby af-
ford them an opportunity to give their opinion on the proposed
decision.
In addition to specifying the type of informaton to be disclosed
it requires the reasons for the proposed decision and its consequences
for the workers also be included. The proposal also indicates the
type of decision which might trigger the consultation procedure. De-
cisions which might cause employees to be adversely affected, include
plant closures, modifications of the undertaking's activities, and mod-
ifications affecting the internal structure or production methods.7 8
76. Id. at art. 3, para. 6. "The terms of this article apply equally where the parent under-
taking is at the same time the subsidiary of another parent undertaking, unless that undertak-
ing is itself meeting the obligations resulting from this article." Id.
77. Id. at art. 4, para. 1.
78. The Amended Proposal states such proposed decisons may in particular relate to:
(a) the closure or transfer of an establishment or major parts thereof;
(b) restrictions or substantial modifications to the activities of the undertaking;
(c) major modifications with regard to organization, working practices or produc-
tion methods including modifications resulting from the introduction of new
technologies;
(d) the introduction of long-term cooperation with other under-takings or the cessa-
tion of such cooperation; and
(e) measures relating to workers' health and to industrial safety.
Id. at art. 4, para. 2.
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Any decisions in these areas should activate the consultation
procedure.
The subsidiaries concerned with a decision such as a plant clo-
sure are not only those where the closure takes place, but also those
to which the activities of the closed plant are transferred. As a result
the management of each subsidiary involved must communicate the
information it has received to the employees' representatives and ask
for their opinion. To fulfill this requirement, management must give
employees' representatives at least thirty days in which to act.79 The
proposed decision cannot be implemented before the opinion of the
employees' representatives is received or before the end of the pre-
scribed period for the delivery of that opinion.80
Given the fact that the management of the parent company and
of the subsidiary are free to disregard the opinion of the employees'
representatives, it is doubtful whether the consultation procedure is
of much benefit to employees. It should be noted that the draft direc-
tive does not confer on the employees any right in the entrepreneurial
decision-making process. Neither does the draft directive impose on
the management of the subsidiary an obligation to enter into bona
fide negotiations with the employees on the substance of such deci-
sions. The draft directive only provides an obligation "to hold con-
sultations with [employees' representatives] with a view to
attempting to reach agreement on the measures planned in respect of
employees."'" The amended proposal merely distinguishes between
the obligation of the management of the subsidiary to ask for the
opinion of the employees on the proposed decision, on the one hand,
and the obligation to conduct consultations with the employees' rep-
resentatives on the other.
Under Article 4 of the amended draft, information on the pro-
posed decision affecting the interests of employees can be withheld if
79. The Amended Proposal states:
Without prejudice to Article 7(1) the management of each subsidiary concerned shall
be required to communicate in writing the information referred to in paragraph 1,
without delay, to the employees' representatives, to ask for their opinion within a
period of at least 30 days from the day on which the information is communicated,
and to hold consultations with them with a view to attempting to reach agreement on
the measures planned in respect of the employees. The provisions of the second sub-
paragraph of Article 3(4) shall apply multatis mutandis.
Id. at art. 4, para. 3.
80. Id. at art. 4, para. 5. "The proposed decision referred to in paragraph 1 shall not be
implemented before the opinion is received or failing that before the end of the given period
specified according to paragraph 3 above." Id.
81. Id. at art. 4, para. 3.
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it is confidential.8 2 In this situation, the obligation to consult the em-
ployees on the proposed decision does not arise. The management of
the subsidiary concerned is, however, required to hold consultations
and to enter into negotiations on the measures planned regarding
workers at least thirty days before any decision resulting from confi-
dential business strategy and affecting the work conditions is effec-
tively carried out. 3 Thus, the interests of the undertaking in
maintaining the secrecy of its business strategy must be balanced
against the interests of the employees and their right to be well-in-
formed and consulted prior to the time their employment or working
conditions are to be modified.
In the event that the management of the subsidiary neglects to
fulfill its obligation to inform and consult on decisions adversely af-
fecting employees, employees' representatives are entitled to appeal
to a tribunal "to compel the management of the subsidiary to fulfill
its obligations." 4 The purpose of this provision is to enable employ-
ees' representatives to preserve their right to be informed and con-
sulted before the implementation of the proposed decision by
management. Although a time limit has been imposed to prevent
further delay in implementing the decision, the draft directive fails to
specify the proper procedure for obtaining injunctive relief in those
member States where injunctions are either unavailable or not speed-
ily available in the area of labor law.
D. Maintaining Confidentiality of Business Information
Perhaps the greatest criticism of the initial proposal was that
business secrets could not be omitted from the information to be dis-
seminated to the employees' representatives. Under the original pro-
posal, employees' representatives were obligated simply to maintain
82. See also id. at art. 7, para. 1.
83. The Amended Proposal provides:
When information concerning a decision within the meaning of paragraph 1 is
withheld because it is secret in the sense of Article 7, paragraph 1, the management of
the subsidiary is nonetheless required, at least 30 days before putting into effect any
decision directly affecting employment or working conditions of the employees, to
hold consultations with the employees' representatives, with a view to attempting to
reach agreement on the measures planned in respect of the employee.
Id. at art. 4, para. 6.
84. The Amended Proposal provides:
Member States shall provide for the employees' representative to have the right, when
the obligations of paragrpah (3) have not been met, to appeal to a tribunal or other
competent national authority for measures to be taken in a maximum period of 30
days to compel the management of the subsidiary to fulfill its obligations on informa-
tion and consultation under paragraph 3 above.
Id. at art. 4, para. 4.
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discretion with information of a confidential nature.8 5 The amended
proposal now provides that management is authorized not to com-
municate information which would substantially damage the under-
taking's interests or lead to the demise of its plans.86 The wording is
sufficiently broad to cover the interests of both subsidiaries and the
parent company. It includes not only business secrets, but also infor-
mation which a company could not disclose without first violating
legal obligations to which it is subject. Among these obligations are
the rules prohibiting the disclosure of insider information in those
member States where such rules have been enacted. 7
It is arguable that the draft directive would be rendered mean-
ingless in practice if management were the sole judge of the secret
nature of information subject to disclosure. For this reason, the
Commission has provided that the employees' representatives shall
have the right to appeal to a tribunal for the settlement of such dis-
putes. This procedure, which had also been provided for under the
original proposal, affords employees' representatives a means to de-
termine whether purported confidential information is subject to
disclosure.88
E. Election of Employees' Representatives
One of the points on which the Commission did not follow the
recommendation of the European Parliament deals with the rules
concerning who is qualified to act as employees' representatives.
Under the Proposal, the Commission adopted the view that this
85. Id. The original Proposal provided:
1. Members and former members of bodies representing employees and delegates
authorized by them shall be required to maintain discretion as regards informa-
tion of a confidential nature. Where they communicate information to third par-
ties they shall take account of the interests of the undertaking and shall not be
such as to divulge secrets regarding the undertaking or its business.
2. The Member States shall empower a tribunal or other national body to settle
disputes concerning the confidentiality of certain information.
3. The Member States shall impose appropriate penalties in cases of infringement of
the secrecy requirement.
Vredeling Proposal, supra note 10, at art. 15.
86. The Amended Proposal states: "The management of an undertaking shall be author-
ized not to communicate secret information. Information may only be treated as secret which,
if disclosed, could substantially damage the undertaking's interests or lead to the failure of its
plans." Amended Vredeling Proposal, supra note 13, at art. 7, para. I.
87. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
88. See Amended Vredeling Proposal, supra note 13, at art. 7, para. 3. "Member States
shall ensure that a tribunal or other competent national authority can settle disputes concern-
ing the secret character of any information withheld in application of paragraph 1, or the
confidential character of information declared as confidential for the purpose of paragraph 2."
Id.
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question can best be resolved in accordance with the practices of the
member States involved. Although Parliament voted in favor of in-
troducing a system of direct elections of employees' representatives
by secret ballot, the Commission chose otherwise. In so doing, the
Commission opined that the Vredeling Proposal was never designed
to alter the industrial relations systems existing in Europe. Instead,
the Commission aptly noted that the Proposal was designed in ac-
cordance with the methods of electing representatives which pres-
ently exist under national laws. Any decision contrary to that of the
Commission's could arguably serve to disrupt European national sys-
tems of jurisprudence and undermine the intentions of the original
sponsor of the Vredeling Proposal.
Under Article 5 of the draft directive, however, provisions were
adopted to ensure that the information and consultation procedures
were compatible with the primary objectives of the directive. Specifi-
cally, a body representing all the employees of a parent company and
its subsidiaries within the European Community may be created by
agreements negotiated between the management of the companies
and the employees' representatives.89 The purpose underlying this
provision is to allow both management and employee representatives
the option of creating an institutional platform which will carry out
the information and consultation procedures required by the direc-
tive thoughout the European Community.90 This particular provi-
sion may have a positive affect on the prospects of establishing a
Community-wide national industrial relations organization.
Finally, the draft allows member States to provide that the in-
formation and consultation procedures may take place directly with
the employees. 9 Thus, under this provision, employee representa-
tives need not exist solely for the purposes of the draft directive. This
will be the case for those undertakings where there is no representa-
tion and where the information and consultation rights are conferred
directly on the employees.
89. Id. at art. 5, para. 3. "A body representing all the employees of the parent undertak-
ing and its subsidiaries within the Community may be created by means of agreements to be
concluded between the management of the undertaking concerned and the employees' repre-
sentatives. If such a body is created, paragraphs I and 2 shall be applicable." Id.
90. This practice can be analogized to the national group works councils which currently
exist in some European countries.
91. Id. at art. 5, para. 5. "Member States may provide that the information and consulta-
tion procedures referred to in Articles 3(4) and (5) and Article 4(3) to (6) may take place
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F Extraterritorial Effects of the Vredeling Proposal
The Vredeling Proposal has been criticized for having extraterri-
torial effects that could be contrary to international law. Where a
parent company located in one of the member States of the Commu-
nity has a subsidiary or "establishment" located in another member
State, it is clear that the parent company is established within the
Community and must therefore respect the law applicable to the ac-
tivities of its subsidiary. The questions of extraterritoriality arise
when a non-Eurpean Community parent company attempts to exer-
cise its power of control over a subsidiary located within the Com-
munity. The mere exercise of control by the parent company over its
subsidiary is arguably an insufficient ground upon which to extend
the prescriptive jurisdiction of the Community and its member States
to regulate the activities of the parent company.
Under Article 3(5) of the amended draft directive, employees'
representatives who are left uninformed about the prospective corpo-
rate decisions of the subsidiary may direct their concerns in writing
to the management of the parent undertaking.92 The article clearly
states that, that undertaking, meaning the parent corporation, "shall
be obligated to communicate the relevant information without delay
to the management of the subsidiary."93 Similarly, Article 4(1) of
the amended proposal clearly provides that "the management of a
parent undertaking ... shall be required to forward precise informa-
tion to the management of each subsidiary concerned in good time
before the final decision is taken. . . ."" Thus, the Vredeling Propo-
sal places a responsibility on the parent corporation of a transna-
tional enterprise, whether inside or outside of the European
Community, to transmit information about the activities of the enter-
prise as a whole and about decisions likely to have serious conse-
92. Id. at art. 3, para. 5. For text see supra note 73.
93. Id. (emphasis added).
94. The provision states in full that:
Where the management of a parent undertaking proposes to take a decision con-
cerning the whole or a major part of the parent undertaking or of a subsidiary in the
Community which is liable to have serious consequences for the interests of the em-
ployees of its subsidiaries in the community, it shall be required to forward precise
information to the management of each subsidiary concerned in good time before the
final decision is taken with a view to the communication of this information to the
employees' representatives as provided in paragraph 3 below. This information shall
in particular give detail of:
-the grounds for the proposed decision;
-the legal, economic and social consequences of such decision for the employed
concerned;
-the measures planned in respect of such employees.
Id. at art. 4, para. 1.
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quences for the interests of the subsidiaries' employees. Where the
parent corporation is a non-European Community member, it can be
argued that these provisions would extend the Community's legal au-
thority beyond the territorial boundaries of its member States.
In essence, these provisions impose unreasonable extraterritorial
obligations on parent undertakings located outside the European
Community. Admittedly, the proposal provides that where a parent
undertaking is located outside of the European Community its man-
agement may be represented in the Community by appointing an
agent who is responsible for fulfilling its obligations or in the absence
of such an agent, the management of each subsidiary will be held
liable for the same obligations regarding information and consulta-
tion.95 This does not, however, excuse the Proposal's seemingly ex-
traterritorial reach because it is the parent corporation, rather than
the subsidiary, which has the information that must be transmitted
under the draft directive. To penalize a subsidiary because of the
negligence of the parent undertaking which is beyond the jurisdiction
of the Community serves to unjustly penalize a party for an act
wholly out of its control.
III. THE "NEW APPROACH" TO THE VREDELING PROPOSAL
AND ITS AFTERMATH
Because the Commission's amended proposal encountered
growing political and substantive objections from some member
States, it became clear that the initiative had little or no chance of
adoption by the Council in the absence of major modifications.96
Perhaps the strongest opposition came from the British government
whose criticism was not based so much on the contents of the propo-
sal, but rather, on the principle compelling companies to disseminate
their investment and production schedules to employees' representa-
tives.97 The British government has taken the position that the dis-
semination of such information can be accomplished through
voluntary action.9" In adhering to this position, the British govern-
95. Id. at art. 2, para. 2. For text see supra note 55.
96. For a directive, such as the Vredeling Proposal, the unanimous support of the ten
member States is required. See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar.
25, 1957, art. 149, 298 U.N.T.S. 11. Article 149 states in part that: "Where, in pursuance of
this Treaty, the Council acts on a proposal from the Commission, unanimity shall be required
for an act constituting an amendment to that proposal." Id.
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ment has urged employers to institute consultation programs in
which corporate information can be voluntarily given to employees'
representatives.9 9
The British government was not alone in expressing its opposi-
tion to the proposed directive. West Germany and Denmark have
expressed similar reservations over the initiative, albeit to a lesser de-
gree, because of their political opposition to a directive that would
regulate European industrial relations. 10°
In an attempt to foster unanimity among member States, the
Irish Presidency of the European Council l"' set up an Ad Hoc Work-
ing Group to discuss additional modifications to the July 1983
amended proposal.' °2 The Ad Hoc Working Group was to address
various technical issues raised by the proposal and clarify positions of
member States, thereby allowing the Labor and Social Affairs Coun-
cil to take greater steps toward the implementation of the propo-
sal. 1 3 Since the first meeting of the Ad Hoc Working Group, a "new
approach" to the highly controversial Vredeling Proposal emerged.
The "new approach" most notably affected the provisions of the ini-
tial proposal dealing with the supply of information to workers on a
regular basis and for consultations with workers' representatives
before corporate policy decisions were implemented."° In addition,
the "new approach" was an attempt to buttress the criticism of the
Commission's 1983 amended proposal which failed to meet the ex-
pectations of some member States regarding industrial relations prac-
tices in Europe.
In its detailed report to the Working Party on Social Questions,
the Ad Hoc Working Group discussed various suggestions for revis-
99. Id.
100. Id. See also Eur. Rep., Bus. Brief, No. 1136 (May 31, 1985) (copy on file with Califor-
nia Western International Law Journal).
101. The Irish Republic assumed the Presidency of the Council in June, 1984. Mr. Ruairi
Quinn, the Irish Minister for Labor, had always expressed interest in the proposed Vredeling
Directive and, after assuming the Presidency of the Council of Ministers for Labor and Social
Affairs, he decided to set up an ad hoc group to work on the proposal. New Approach on
"Vredeling", 133 EUR. IND. REL. REV. 10, 10 (1985) [hereinafter cited as New Approach].
102. Eur. Rep., Bus. Brief, No. 1091 (May 31, 1985) (copy on file with California Western
International Law Journal). The working group was chaired by well-known industrial rela-
tions expert Dr. Mary Redmond.
103. The Ad Hoc Working Group met six times between September 14 and November 27,
1984, on which date it submitted a detailed report to the Working Party on Social Questions.
Id.
104. Eur. Rep., Bus. Brief, No. 1091 (Dec. 11, 1984) (copy on file with California Western
International Law Journal).
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ing the 1983 amended proposal.0 5 Under this "new approach" to
the Vredeling Proposal, the term "multinational" would appear for
the first time since the original draft. 1 6 Unlike the original pream-
ble, which was riddled with definitions of "parent undertaking" and
"subsidiaries," the "new approach" greatly simplified the initiative
by focusing on the rights and responsibilities of employers to employ-
ees in all companies employing individuals above a given thresh-
old. 10 7 Perhaps the most striking aspect of the Group's suggested
change is that it deletes the terms "parent undertaking and subsidi-
ary," "establishment," "decision-making centre" and "manage-
ment' ' 8 because they are unnecessary given the fact that the new
draft would abandon the company law approach in favor of a less
legal approach. 19
An example of the simplicity of the "new approach" is illus-
trated by the Group's suggested Article 2 which delineates the scope
of the draft Directive." 0 Article 2 clearly states that "all employees
105. Id. at 111. Although these suggestions represented a major new initiative to provide
progress on the draft, they did not have any official status, and as such, merely reflect the
discussions within the Ad Hoc Working Group and the personal ideas of the Irish Presidency.
106. Id. at 112.
107. New Approach, supra note 101, at 11. The simplicity of the "new approach" is best
exemplified by the Group's suggested changes to Article 7 of the 1983 amended draft. For
example, from that article, which relates to the disclosure of confidential information, the
Group suggested deleting reference to "secret information" so as to clear up the potential ambi-
guity resulting from a distinction between "secrecy" and "confidentiality." Id. at 13. The
simplicity of the "new approach" is readily apparent in light of the Ad Hoc Working Group's
suggested Article 2. That suggested article reads in pertinent part:
(A) Connected persons: a person shall be connected with an employer if he has a
right to participate in a distribution of profits or to participate in the appoint-
ment of a governing body of an employer or if he has any such rights in connec-
tion with an employer.
(B) Employees' representatives: the employees' representatives shall mean the rep-
resentatives of the employees provided for by the laws or practice of the Mem-
ber States, with the exception of members of administrative, managing or
supervisory boards of companies who sit on such bodies in certain Member
States as employees' representatives.
Id. at 112.
108. Compare Amended Vredeling Proposal, supra note 13.
109. New Approach, supra note 101, at 11.
110. This paragraph states:
(a) The duties imposed by this Directive on an employer shall apply only to an
employer who at the date the duty is to be performed either:
-has within the Community at least [1,000] employees; or
-is one of a number of persons whose accounts are required to be consolidated
... and the aggregate of the employees within the Community of those persons
is at least [1,000] .... the employees to be engaged in activities predominantly
commercial;
and
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in undertakings over a certain size are covered by the draft Direc-
tive's provisions, even when these undertakings operate as a single
unit.""' In contrast to the "new approach," the prior drafts had
applied only to parent undertakings with complex structures and not
to those undertakings which operated without any subsidiaries.
With regard to Articles 3 and 4 of the prior drafts, the Ad Hoc
Working Group expanded the types of corporate information to be
disclosed to employees' representatives and the circumstances under
which a subsidiary is required to consult with employees' representa-
tives. Article 3, which deals with disclosure of corporate informa-
tion, would obligate an employer to provide its employees'
representatives "with information relating to the employers' business
as it affects the employees of the employer including any such infor-
mation then known to any person connected with the employer."
11 2
Under the "new approach" to Vredeling, the term "employers' busi-
ness" would replace the phrase "parent undertaking and its subsidi-
aries as a whole." ' 1 3 More importantly, the types of information to
be disclosed have been expanded to identify the specific power source
of those decisions affecting employees within the corporate struc-
ture.1 4 The disclosure of such additional information is likely to
benefit employees' representatives, who might otherwise lack know-
ledge regarding where policy decisions are made, by increasing their
awareness of the reasons underlying corporate policy. "' Finally,
(b) A person acting on behalf of himself and others as agent is to be considered with
them as one person for the above purpose.
Id. It should be noted that the number in brackets indicates the various size thresholds, one of
the principal areas necessitating future discussion.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 113. If the suggested change is approved, Article 3 would read as follows:
1. At least once a year the employer shall provide its employees' representatives
with information relating to the employers' business as it affects the employees of
the employer, including any such information then known to any person con-
nected with the employer. This information shall relate in particular to:
-structure to the extent necessary to disclose who within the employer and who
among persons connected with the employer has power, whether acting alone or
in concert, to make decisions affecting the employee of the employers;
-the economic and financial situation such as that which arises from the annual
accounts or annual consolidated accounts;
-the foreseeable development of the business and of production and sales
-the employment situation and foreseeable trends; and
-an indication of foreseeable investment trends.
2. Employee's representatives shall have the right to obtain explanations of the in-
formation which has been provided to them.
Id.
113. Compare the suggested changes to art. 3, supra note 112, with Amended Vredeling
Proposal, supra note 13, at art. 3, para. 1. For text see supra note 71.
114. New Approach, supra note 101, at 12.
115. The suggested changes regarding the disclosure of information on decision-making
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paragraph 2 would grant employees' representatives the right to ex-
planations regarding the information they receive." 16
Because the 1983 amended proposal provided that "representa-
tives may [only] ask the management for oral explanations of the
information communicated,""' 7 it appears that the "new approach"
may strengthen the role representatives play in corporate decision-
making. However, where management has failed to communicate
the required information, it appears that the employees' representa-
tives can do no more to enforce their right than that which was pro-
vided to them under the 1983 amended draft-they "may approach
in writing the management of the parent undertaking."'' "I Thus, the
"new approach" which grants employee representatives the "right"
to receive an explanation from management is without significance
until they are given a similar right of recourse to demand that man-
agement honor their request.
The "new approach" is best illustrated by the suggested changes
to Article 4 of the 1983 amended proposal. Article 4, which deals
with an undertaking's duty to consult with employees' representa-
tives when decisions are "liable to have serious consequences on the
interest of its employees,"' 9 would now be changed to read:
Where an employer or any person connected with an employer
proposes to make a decision which is liable to have serious conse-
quences on the interests of its employees, the employer shall pro-
vide precise information in writing to the employees'
representatives. This information shall be provided in good time
before the final decision is taken so that the employees' representa-
tives may have the opportunity to give an opinion on the proposed
decision and so that consultations with the employees' representa-
tives may be held with a view to reaching an agreement and to
mitigating the consequences of the decision.
120
The suggested language would require management to provide perti-
nent information to representatives for the purposes of alleviating the
possible harsh consequences of its decisions. Thus, a mere good faith
duty to consult with employees' representatives appears sufficient.' 2'
centers, which were added by the Irish Presidency, are not representative of the Ad Hoc Work-
ing Group's discussions. Id.
116. Id.
117. See Amended Vredeling Proposal, supra note 13, at art. 3, para. 4 (emphasis added).
118. See id. at art. 3, para. 5 (emphasis added).
119. See id. at art 4, para. 1.
120. New Approach, supra note 101, at 12.
121. Article 4 of the 1983 amended proposal did not address whether management had a
good faith duty to consult. See Amended Vredeling Proposal, sitpra note 13, at art. 4, para. 1.
Vol. 16
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In addition, the suggested Article 4 would mandate that information
relating to the decision be "in writing," a requirement not imposed
under the 1983 draft.
Although the provisions of Article 4 relating to the disclosure of
corporate information were basically left unchanged, the Ad Hoc
Working Group did object to Article 4(4) of the amended draft
which permitted employees' representatives to appeal to "a tribunal
or other competent national authority" as a means of forcing man-
agement to comply with its duty to inform and consult with repre-
sentatives on major corporate decisions within thirty days of the
prescribed date.' 22 The Group suggested a change which requires
member States to individually implement enforcement measures. 23
The suggested change would raise the issue of the types of sanctions
which could be imposed on managment for its non-compliance.
Even more important is the question of whether such sanctions are
properly enforceable. Given the various sanctions that could be ap-
plied, the "new approach" circumvents the issue by merely requiring
member States to "provide appropriate measures" to ensure compli-
ance by management. 124 The use of such broad language as a stan-
dard for dealing with the question of sanctions, while not significant
in itself, may lead to the imposition of inconsistent, arbitrarily-chosen
sanctions throughout the European Community-a result contrary
to achieving a uniform system of procedure for European industry.
The drafting of a "new" Article 6 represents the most significant
change resulting from the Ad Hoc Working Group's discussion:
"Any person connected with an employer shall supply the employer
at the place of employment with such information possessed by him
as may be necessary to enable the employer to discharge his du-
ties. . "1t25 Given the "new approach," a parent undertaking would
122. It should be noted that the remaining provisions of Article 4 relating to the types of
information to be disclosed or the types of decisions over which management is required to
consult with employees' representatives have not been significantly changed. New Approach,
supra note 101, at 12.
123. The Ad Hoc Working Group's suggested change, Article 4(4) would now read as
follows:
Member States shall provide appropriate measures to require the employer to comply
with his obligations. They shall ensure that the decision shall not be implemented
until the employees' representatives have been afforded the opportunity to give their
opinion on the proposed decision or failing that until a period of 30 days has elapsed
after the date of communication of the information to the employees' representatives.
Id.
124. The enforceability of sanctions is particularly problematic in cases of infringement.
See id. at 14.
125. Id. A different proposal presented to the Ad Hoc Working Group would have
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now be required to supply that information necessary for an em-
ployer to satisfy those obligations enumerated in Article 3 which re-
late to disclosure. 126 Under the original Article 3(5), the
controversial "by pass" provision would have permitted the employ-
ees' representatives of a subsidiary to directly address central man-
agement in writing if local management had failed to satisfy its
disclosure obligations within the prescribed time.'2 7 Article 6, as
suggested, would relieve employees' representatives from the task of
approaching central management in writing because it would be in-
cumbent on the parent corporation to disseminate that information
to its subsidiary, which in turn would be made available to employ-
ees' representatives.
128
In addition to the Ad Hoc Working Group's Article 2(2) that
the draft directive should apply to all undertakings over a certain
threshold, Article 8(1) exemplifies the second most notable change of
the "new approach."' 129  It allows the proposal's requirements to be
replaced by collective agreement. 3 ° The idea that the rights and ob-
ligations of the proposal may be replaced by collectively agreed-upon
procedures is completely new. Although the issue arose as to
whether a collective agreement could effectively implement a Direc-
tive under the Treaty of Rome,"' it has been suggested that Article
8(1) was drafted as a concession to such member States as the United
granted employees a right of compensation as the only appropriate sanction for non-compliance
with Article 4. Id. at 12.
126. Id. at 13.
127. See Vredeling Proposal, supra note 10, at art. 3, para. 5.
128. New Approach, supra note 101, at 13. The Ad Hoc Working Group withdrew the
original "bypass" provision from consideration as a practical matter. See id.
129. Specifically, it provides:
Member States shall provide appropriate measures to require the employer and any
person connected with an employer to comply with his or their obligations. The
rights and obligations respectively given and imposed by this Directive may be re-
placed by the provisions of a collective agreement relating to information and consul-
tation of employees provided that any such agreement is authorized by a national
authority competent to do so and that its procedures and its remedies are as beneficial
as those provided by this Directive.
Id.
130. Id.
131. Article 189 provides that: "A directive shall be binding, as to the result to be
achieved, upon each Member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national
authorities the choice of form and methods." Treaty of Rome, supra note 49, at art. 189. In
addressing the issue, the Legal Service of the Council issued an opinion which concluded that:
(i) Collective agreements which are not binding at law cannot be regarded as giving
effect to Directives;
(ii) Collective agreements which are binding at law, either by virtue of their inherent
character or by virtue of measures adopted by the member states, can be re-
garded as an acceptable means of giving effect to the Directive provided that
they secure the execution of all the obligations incumbent on the member state,
Vol. 16
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Kingdom and the Irish Republic which ascribe to the notion that
statutory intervention could harm industrial relations which tradi-
tionally have been conducted on a voluntary basis.1
32
The suggestions of the Ad Hoc Working Group, which eventu-
ally became part of the Irish Presidency's initiative, have unquestion-
ably broken the deadlock on the original Vredeling Proposal.
Although progress was made, the initiative remains only a sugges-
tion, not a proposal. The Irish Presidency was hopeful, however,
that the Ad Hoc Working Group's analysis of certain issues in the
amended draft and its clarification of the positions of the member
States would provide the Labor and Social Affairs Council with an
opportunity to take the final steps towards implementing the Vredel-
ing Proposal.
On December 13, 1984, the Council of Ministers for Labor and
Social Affairs met and discussed the various alternatives for revising
the 1983 amended proposal. 33 This discussion was primarily based
on a report written by the Council's Committee of Permanent Repre-
sentatives and submitted to the Council of Ministers in which policy
issues and alternative resolutions were carefully examined. Although
the Council of Social Affairs Ministers was unable to come to any
substantive decision based on the "new approach," it did agree that
each member State would respond to the complex legal issues raised
by the Ad Hoc Working Group.' 34
At the meeting of the Council of Social Affairs' experts group
held on January 30, 1985, the various replies by members States were
reviewed.' 35 At that time, each member State was favorably disposed
which of course remains responsible for the full and proper execution of the
Directive.
Thus, collective agreements may implement directives if the provision is subject to judicial
review. New Approach, supra note 101, at 13.
132. New Approach, supra note 101, at 13.
133. Id.
134. Eur. Rep., Bus. Brief, No. 1093 (Dec. 19, 1984).
135. Id. See also Eur. Rep., Bus. Brief, No. 1091 (Dec. 11, 1984). Based on the report
presented by the Ad Hoc Working Group, the Council of Ministers was to examine a series of
complex legal issues among which the most important are the following:
(a) whether it is useful to continue further discussion of the Vredeling Proposal on
the basis of the "new approach";
(b) whether those Member States, which traditionally have advocated that the dis-
closure of corporate information be done on a voluntary basis, would be in favor of
the proposed directive were it possible to implement it through collective agreements;
(c) whether the Member States agree that greater coordination between the pro-
posed initiative and other EC directives is necessary;
(d) whether the terms used in the proposed directive should be defined by the indi-
vidual Member States;
(e) whether a "by-pass" clause should be incorporated into the proposed directives,
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to continue working on the Vredeling Proposal on the basis of the
"new approach" which emerged from the discussions within the Ad
Hoc Working Group. 136 Despite this progress, it became apparent in
Europe that the positions of the United Kingdom and Denmark re-
mained unchanged.' 37 In 1985, with a new Italian Presidency of the
Council, it was made clear that further negotiations on the proposed
Directive would cease until such time as the Commission determined
whether the "new approach," if it was substantially different from
the original proposal, would be drafted as a new proposal.138 In
short, further progress on the proposal has come to a standstill.' 39
CONCLUSION
The European Economic Community has witnessed the birth of
the Vredeling Proposal, a draft directive on procedures for informing
and consulting employees. Although the intention of the proposal's
original sponsor Henk Vredeling was to draft a directive aimed at
safeguarding the rights of employees, it appears that compliance with
thereby permitting employee representatives to speak directly with corporate manage-
ment of the parent company;
(f) whether the proposed directive should list in detail the sanctions that could be
imposed against companies which fail to comply; and
(g) whether an employer has a right to withhold from employee representatives cer-
tain types of corporate information.
Id.
136. Eur. Rep., Bus. Brief, No. 1103 (Feb. 1, 1985).
137. Eur. Rep., Bus. Brief, No. 1136 (May 31, 1985).
138. Id. Another idea suggested by the Italian Presidency was to downgrade the legal form
of the Vredeling Proposal from a binding Directive to a Recommendation. This plan, however,
was abandoned when neither the member States which endorsed the Commission's proposal for
a Directive nor the United Kingdom and Denmark expressed any enthusiasm over it.
Much of the opposition from the member States which originally had favored the proposal
can be attributed to their concern that converting the Vredeling Directive into a Vredeling
Recommendation would conflict with the proposals of the European Parliament and the Com-
mission. See Commission of the European Communities, Spokesman's Service, Written Ques-
tion No. 587/85 (1985).
139. The belief that little or no progress was being made on the Vredeling Proposal became
a reality when the proposal did not appear on the agenda of the Council of Social Affairs
Ministers on December 5, 1985. Given the opposition to the draft directive from the United
Kingdom and Denmark, meetings between the Presidency's experts were not organized. In
fact, the European Commission has not even required the Presidency to hold meetings because
it appears dubious whether any further progress can be achieved. Recognizing that the govern-
ment of the United Kingdom, in conjunction with the Confederation of British Industry, has
consistently opposed "every term, word, comma ... in the proposal until the momentum be-
hind it ran out of steam," the Commission is now willing to wait until the political climate in
Europe changes in favor of adopting the draft Directive. The question of how long the Com-
mission will wait still remains unanswered. What is certain, however, is that practically noth-
ing will occur within the next few months. See, Eur. Rep., Bus. Brief, No. 1180 (Nov. 29,
1985); J. Com., Nov. 22, 1985, at 4A, col. 2.
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the Proposal would be costly and confusing for many transnational
enterprises seeking to conduct business within the European Com-
munity. Although the European Commission's amended draft direc-
tive represents a more refined version of the original proposal,
additional modifications are necessary.
Critics have argued that the Vredeling Proposal is merely a
means by which the European labor movement can impose transna-
tional collective bargaining or European style "works councils" on
multinational enterprises. The draft directive fails to take into con-
sideration the fact that organized labor in different countries often
have conflicting interests. The threat imposed on non-European
Community parent undertakings which have subsidiaries in the Eu-
ropean Community to comply with those draft provisions requiring
the disclosure of information and consultation with employees could
very well inhibit investment in the Community rather than foster the
growth of employment.
The interests of employees with respect to their right to receive
information and consult with management on those policy issues
having an effect on their employment must be carefully balanced
with the interests of management to make decisions which are
deemed beneficial to the undertaking as a whole. Should the balanc-
ing of these interests not be tempered with sound judgment, multina-
tional corporations may decide to gradually withdraw their
investment capital from those member States in which they currently
have subsidiaries. The final result is certain to have a negative im-
pact on the state of the European Community-a result directly con-
trary to that intended by Vredeling.
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